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“[I]t is vitally important that Myanmar learn lessons from other countries
that have experience in these processes.”1

*
J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Dayton School of Law. The Author would like to thank
Professor Chris Roederer for his advice and guidance through the nuances of transitional justice.
1
Tomás Ojea Quintana (Special Rapporteur), Progress Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, ¶ 75, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/67 (Mar. 7, 2012). The country of
Myanmar is often referred to as Burma. See John M. Epling, How Far Have We Come and Where Do We
Go from Here? A Culturally Sensitive Strategy for Judicial Independence in Myanmar, 27 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 107, n.1 (2016). The Tatmadaw changed the name of the country from Burma to Myanmar in
1988 to assert the distinctiveness of the military government and the Burmese people. See James F. Guyot
& John Badgley, Myanmar in 1989: Tatmadaw V, 30 ASIAN SURV. 187, 188 (1990). For the sake of
consistency, this Comment will refer to the country in question as Myanmar throughout its entirety.
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I. INTRODUCTION
According to a 2018 report by the United Nations Human Rights
Council (“HRC”), the Rohingya Muslims of the Rakhine State region in
Myanmar face “a continuing situation of severe, systemic and
institutionalized oppression from birth to death” at the hands of the Myanmar
government, the military known as the Tatmadaw, and the majority Buddhist
population.2 As a part of this “institutionalized oppression,” the government
and Tatmadaw have forcibly displaced the Rohingya and other ethnic Muslim
populations in Myanmar in numbers surpassing 140,000 people.3 The
atrocities do not stop at simple displacement but include wide-spread rape and
sexual violence, forced labor, death by beating and fire, and the razing of
Muslim villages.4 Although Myanmar is in the throes of this violent and
arguably genocidal conflict, the situation is reminiscent of other genocides in
our world’s history, all of which eventually came to an end. Rather than
suggesting a means for attaining this end, this Comment considers a future
post-conflict Myanmar, a country in which ethnic and religious healing must
take place in order to secure enduring peace.
Transitional justice is defined by the International Center for
Transitional Justice (“ICTJ”) as “the ways countries emerging from periods
of conflict and repression address . . . human rights violations so numerous
and so serious that the normal justice system will not be able to provide an
adequate response.”5 The United Nations (“U.N.”) Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights describes the four tenets of transitional
justice as follows:
(a) the State obligation to investigate and prosecute alleged
perpetrators of gross violations of human rights and serious
violations of international humanitarian law, including
sexual violence, and to punish those found guilty; (b) the
right to know the truth about past abuses and the fate of
disappeared persons; (c) the right to reparations for victims
of gross violations of human rights and serious violations of
international humanitarian law; and (d) the State obligation
to prevent, through different measures, the reoccurrence of
such atrocities in the future.6
In recent decades, scholarship on transitional justice has expanded
2
U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on
Myanmar, ¶ 11–20, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/64 (Sept. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Report on Myanmar].
3
Id. ¶ 29.
4
Id. ¶ 36–39.
5
What is Transitional Justice?, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., https://www.ictj.org/about
/transitional-justice (last visited May 16, 2021).
6
U.N. Off. of the High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Transitional Justice and Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, at 5, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/13/5 (2014).
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significantly, addressing the many different approaches to transitional justice
and attempting to find an approach that adequately accomplishes these
tenets.7 These approaches include, but are not limited to, criminal
prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations, and institutional reform.8 Each
have been implemented in various settings.9
While each approach has attained some success in post-conflict areas,
a method of transitional justice that creates a stable and sustainable rule of
law, while also realizing a level of truth, healing, and justice, has not yet been
implemented. Such a method must primarily rely on a deep and thorough
understanding of the “rule of law” needs for any given transitional society.10
However, this thorough understanding is not easily achieved, as the role of
the rule of law in transitional justice is nuanced and definitions of the rule of
law are amorphous.11
Those seeking to create a sustainable rule of law in a post-conflict
society must consider the cultural background and structures of the society in
question and weigh these considerations against internationally accepted rule
of law norms.12 To expand on this idea, there is a dialectic between
universalist, or ethnocentric, approaches to the rule of law—those that use the
outside “evaluators’ domestic criteria and values as universal standards”—
and culturally relativist approaches—those that rely “exclusively on the
foreign [post-conflict] culture’s criteria and values as standards for
evaluation.”13 Approaches that rely more heavily on ethnocentrism risk an
7
See generally Ian Holliday, Thinking About Transitional Justice in Myanmar, 22 S.E. ASIA
RES. 183 (2014).
8
What is Transitional Justice?, supra note 5.
9
See id.
10
Elizabeth Andersen, Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law: Lessons from the Field, 47 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 305, 309 (2015)
Reframing the purpose of transitional justice as re-establishing the rule of law
provides a framework for choosing among transitional justice approaches and
processes that is both principled and flexible, accommodating contextspecific transitional justice solutions that contemporary research shows are most
effective. In one context, re-establishing the rule of law might require vetting and
lustration of security forces responsible for past abuses and prone to future
violations. In another, truth-telling or reparations processes that help re-establish a
broad-based rule of law culture may be in order.
Id. (emphasis added).
11
See Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L.
J. 2009, 2016–18 (1997).
12
See Anderson, supra note 10, at 309–10 (“These assessments could take advantage of best practices
in rule of law development assistance, including participatory research in affected communities, local
ownership of program design, sustainability guarantees, and plans for monitoring and evaluating the
intervention.”).
13
Epling, supra note 1, at 128. Many scholars have characterized universalist standards as
ethnocentric–“attributing to human actions meanings, reasons, and causes that are common in our modern
Western context but that are lacking in other contexts, resulting in an inadequate understanding and
explanation of many of these actions.” Miguel A. Cabrera, A Critique of Ethnocentrism and the Crisis of
Modernity, 47 HIST. & THEORY 607, 607 (2008) (emphasis added). In other words, “universalist”
standards often focus far too much on Western values and are not in fact “universal.” Id. For the purposes
of this Comment, I will refer to the universalist approach as “ethnocentric” to illustrate the pitfalls of this
approach.
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inability to take root in a culture that cannot relate to those prevailing norms.14
Meanwhile, culturally relativist approaches conversely risk ignoring
important values and norms, like those embodied in human rights, for the sake
of “respecting” another culture.15 This dialectic makes the development of a
sustainable rule of law in post-conflict societies extremely delicate because
weighing too heavily on either side of the dialectic may hinder the success of
this development.
One way in which international leaders have somewhat mitigated
these difficulties is through Rule 11 bis—a procedural rule used similarly in
both the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(“ICTR”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(“ICTY”).16 In the briefest of terms, this Rule allowed for the transfer of ICTR
and ICTY defendants back to national courts in certain circumstances,
provided that the national court could properly adjudicate the cases.17 Thus,
the Rule theoretically created an interaction and a balance between
international and national courts—between an often ethnocentric approach to
the rule of law and a culturally relativist approach to the rule of law.18
An analysis of Rule 11 bis in transitional societies and its relationship
with the ethnocentrism-cultural relativism dialectic is valuable to postconflict judiciaries because history has shown that the judiciary in a postconflict society is integral to the legitimacy of a new, transitional regime.19
Although many aspects of the rule of law will be lacking in post-conflict
Myanmar, a well-functioning relationship between international and domestic
justice will be an important area on which transitional justice initiatives must
focus. Fortunately, scholarship on the role of the international and domestic
judiciaries in transitional justice has not been created from a vacuum.20 Past
transitional societies have implemented various forms of courts, providing
lessons on the successes and failures of their attempts to build a sustainable
rule of law.21 The practice of assessing past implementations of transitional
14
See Cabrera, supra note 13, at 607; Andersen, supra note 10, at 312 (“[T]rials conducted in English
or French in the Hague had little resonance or positive impact on the affected populations . . . and they did
nothing to develop the capacity of local justice sector institutions.”).
15
See Epling, supra, note 1, at 128.
16
See Olympia Bekou, Rule 11 BIS: An Examination of the Process of Referrals to National Courts
in ICTY Jurisprudence, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 723, 723–24 (2009).
17
Nicola Palmer, Transfer or Transformation?: A Review of the Rule 11 BIS Decisions of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 20 AFR. J. OF INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 1 (2012).
18
See Bekou, supra note 16, at 728. “Indeed article 9 of the ICTY Statute indicates that the Tribunal
was not intended to replace or displace national courts; rather, the Tribunal coexists with national courts
under a system of concurrent jurisdiction.” Andersen, supra note 10, at 313 (noting that Rule 11 bis played
a role in attempting to bridge the gap between the international and the national).
19
See Teitel, supra note 11, at 2030.
20
See Hollie Nyseth Brehm & Shannon Golden, Centering Survivors in Local Transitional Justice,
13 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 101, 101 (2017).
21
See, e.g., Lars Waldorf, Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda, INT’L CTR. FOR
TRANSITIONAL JUST. (June 2009), https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Rwanda-CaseStudy2009-English.pdf.
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justice will be vital to the people of Myanmar as they navigate their
treacherous post-conflict environment.
This Comment argues that as Myanmar approaches the moment in
time for transitional justice processes, the foundation of these processes must
be built according to the strengths and weaknesses of their implementation in
similar post-conflict environments and according to the unique conditions in
Myanmar. Myanmar must place a special emphasis on the post-conflict, ruleof-law judiciary by integrating ethnocentric norms regarding the rule of law
and Myanmar’s culturally relativist understanding of the rule of law. To this
end, Part II discusses the background to this study. This background includes
an exposition of the current state of the relationship between transitional
justice and the rule of law, along with the turbulent history of Myanmar. This
background also describes brief histories of the role of post-conflict courts
and Rule 11 bis in Rwanda, a post-conflict state utilized by this Comment as
a case study. Next, Part III examines the rule-of-law successes and failures
of the gacaca courts and Rule 11 bis in Rwanda before applying the lessons
learned to Myanmar’s unique situation. Lastly, Part IV will offer a brief
summary and concluding thoughts concerning transitional justice and rule of
law in post-conflict Myanmar.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Relationship between Transitional Justice and Rule of Law
The judiciary arguably plays an integral, well-established, and
consistent role in transitional justice and the rule of law.22 As stated
previously, the four major approaches to transitional justice include criminal
prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations, and institutional reform.23
These processes range from those that give victims the most voice (truth
commissions) to those that give victims compensation but little voice
whatsoever (reparations).24 However, the four categories overlap and support
each other considerably.25 This Comment will focus on the approaches of
criminal prosecutions, truth-exposing courts, and institutional reform in the
judiciary.
22
See Teitel, supra note 11, at 2030. This is not always the case, as sometimes the judiciary can
obstruct transitional justice. See Lavinia Stan, Transition, Justice and Transitional Justice in
Poland, 6 ROMANIAN POL. SCI. REV. 257, 263 (During Poland’s transition from communist rule,
“[w]ith some exceptions, communist judges and prosecutors were obedient instruments of
the repressive apparatus, detaining opponents without legal basis, orchestrating show-trials with predetermined outcomes, fabricating evidence, and sending thousands to prison for their political opinions.”).
23
What is Transitional Justice?, supra note 5.
24
Can We Handle the Truth? International Day for the Right to the Truth, INT’L CTR. FOR
TRANSITIONAL JUST., https://www.ictj.org/gallery-items/truth-commissions (last visited Jan. 17, 2021);
Reparations, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST. https://www.ictj.org/our-work/transitional-justiceissues/reparations (last visited Jan. 17, 2021).
25
What is Transitional Justice?, supra note 5.
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Criminal prosecutions are perhaps the most visible processes in
international transitional justice. Similar to domestic criminal prosecutions,
transitional criminal prosecutions are “focused on generating individual
accountability for mass atrocity crimes.”26 Widely recognized examples of
this type of judicial transitional justice were the ad hoc criminal tribunals
formed by the United Nations following the atrocities in Rwanda and
Yugoslavia—commonly known as the ICTR and ICTY, respectively.27
Despite calling international attention to the crimes that were committed,
these tribunals were criticized for being “distant from and largely inaccessible
to the communities they were intended to serve” and thus void of any “local
ownership.”28 Without this local ownership, there was no “local agency,
control, or ‘buy in’ when it came to core justice-related [issues].”29 Further,
not every perpetrator of every crime is captured when these tribunals occur,
and some victims’ voices are left out and lack vindication.30 These are the
difficulties in ethnocentric approaches to the rule of law.31 Domestic
tribunals, rather than international, are sometimes implemented, but these
often face logistical difficulties in a state with only post-conflict institutional
abilities.32
A positive aspect to pursuing very visible criminal prosecutions in a
post-conflict society is that they work to establish a permanent rule of law. In
contrast with truth commissions, which typically assume the guilt of the
perpetrator and the innocence of the victim, criminal prosecutions lay the
foundation for rule of law practices such as due process and a fair trial.33
Affording the perpetrators rights, rather than indiscriminate punishment,
helps to prevent further conflict between two alienated groups while still
implementing justice.34 Importantly, “hybrid” tribunals that are a mix of
26

Holliday, supra note 7, at 187.
Dustin N. Sharp, Interrogating the Peripheries: The Preoccupations of Fourth Generation
Transitional Justice, 26 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 149, 163 (2013).
28
Id.
29
Id. at 161.
30
See Criminal Justice, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSIT’L JUST., https://www.ictj.org/our-work/transitionaljustice-issues/criminal-justice (last visited Mar. 13, 2021).
31
The International Criminal Court (“ICC”) was created partly in response to what some viewed as
the success of the ICTY and ICTR. Gabriel Bottini, Universal Jurisdiction After the Creation of the
International Criminal Court, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 503, 504 (2004). Because “the early tribunals
enabled the world to see that international criminal tribunals can deliver justice and help resolve problems
in countries struggling with the difficulties that come with protracted conflicts,” the international
community, through the Rome Statute, agreed to create a permanent international court to prosecute crimes
occurring worldwide. Id. Despite the ICC’s foundation on “sovereign equality” among member states,
the ICC in practice relies heavily on support from the resource-rich Western nations, inevitably leading to
the imposition of “the West’s values on the developing world.” Id. at 555–56. Further, the ICC “gives
powerful nations a means of politically influencing less powerful ones.” Id. at 556. Thus, the ICC
perpetuates the ethnocentrism mentioned in this Comment. See id.
32
Criminal Justice, supra note 30.
33
See Brehm & Golden, supra note 20, at 106.
34
See, e.g., Maya Sosnov, The Adjudication of Genocide: Gacaca and the Road to Reconciliation in
Rwanda, 36 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 125, 147 (2008) (“Failure to [follow due process] weakens gacaca
in the eyes of the local populace and the international community.”). Importantly, the international
community has oft debated whether a true balance exists between the rights of those viewed as the
27
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international criminal prosecutions and local proceedings have been
implemented with varying success.35 Rule 11 bis is a facet of this “mix,” and
one that must be adapted in response to its historical effects.
Moreover, institutional reform is vital to transitioning societies.
According to the ICTJ, “[i]nstitutional reform is the process of reviewing and
restructuring state institutions so that they respect human rights, preserve the
rule of law, and are accountable to their constituents.”36 The judiciary is an
important subject of institutional reform, and many possible avenues may lead
to a sustainable rule of law in the judiciary. One of these avenues is the
development of local courts that are steeped in both domestic culture and
international rule of law norms.37 From a theoretical perspective, this
approach has the opportunity to create a dialectical balance:
If we re-conceptuali[z]e the relationship between the Self and
the Other as a dialectic relationship between heterogeneous
and hybrid entities, we can generate comparative law
approaches that go beyond ethnocentrism and cultural
relativism. These approaches utili[z]e the dialectic force
between the Self and the Other as a specific comparatistic
source knowledge and basis to generate value judgements,
make visible hybridi[z]ation, influence between different
legal systems and the co-existence of similarities and
differences and enforce intercultural legal dialogue and
understanding.38
With these nuances and considerations in mind, one must turn to the
factual situation in Myanmar so as to tailor a judicial plan appropriate for the
specific situation presented.
B. Current and Past Situation in Myanmar
1. Origins of the Conflict in Myanmar
When the National League for Democracy (“NLD”) government
came to power in Myanmar in 2015, the international community was hopeful

perpetrators of crimes and those viewed as the victims during international criminal tribunals. See
generally William A. Schabas, Victor’s Justice: Selecting “Situations” at the International Criminal
Court, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 535 (2010). Aware of the tendency to presume the “perpetrators” of
heinous crimes as guilty, Human Rights Watch stated that “the ICTR would not properly complete its
mandate if it did not mete out justice to both sides.” Id. at 538.
35
See Sharp, supra note 28, at 163–64.
36
Institutional Reform, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSIT’L JUST. https://www.ictj.org/our-work/transitionaljustice-issues/institutional-reform (last visited Mar. 17, 2021).
37
See Epling, supra note 1, at 128–29.
38
Judith Schacherreiter, Das Verhängnis von Ethnozentrismus und Kulturrelativismus in
der Rechtsvergleichung: Ursachen, Ausprängungsformen und Strategien zur Überwindung, 77 RABEL J.
OF COMP. & INT’L PRIVATE L. 272, 299 (2013).
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that ethnic conflict might abate as democracy triumphed.39 This abatement
did not occur, though, as ethnic conflict continues and has in fact worsened.40
Religious and ethnic conflict between the Buddhist Burmese majority and the
Muslim minorities has existed in Myanmar for decades.41 Martin Smith notes
that “conditions of ethnic and political strife have transcended all three eras
of government since independence from Great Britain,” and anti-government
disaffection has compelled many different ethnic and religious groups in
Myanmar to perpetually pursue civil conflict.42
Under British authority, Myanmar was not an independent colony but
simply an “Indian province.”43 Thus, the British Indian government allowed
Indians to freely immigrate to and from Myanmar.44 As Muslim Indians
flooded into Myanmar for work and were favored by the British, the ethnic
Arakanese in Burma were repressed and experienced an increase in ethnoreligious nationalism; thus, the seeds of discrimination against non-Buddhist
peoples were planted.45 In the Rakhine State region, before British
colonization, small numbers of Muslims lived in peace with the native
Arakanese in the region.46 During the periods of increased migration under
British colonial rule, the Arakanese were marginalized as more Muslims
began moving into the area.47 These sociopolitical changes sparked the
Rakhine Buddhist population’s bitter hatred toward the Muslims, specifically
the Rohingya.48
Following the end of British colonial rule in 1948, the Rohingya
actually experienced a brief period of non-problematic existence with the
Buddhists in Myanmar under the leadership of Prime Minister U Nu, who
encouraged the recognition of the Rohingya “as a legitimate ethnic group that
deserved a homeland in [Myanmar].”49 This coexistence, however, was shortlived as General Ne Win came to power in 1962.50 As the government began
to deny the Rohingya rights as citizens, around 200,000 Rohingya fled to
Bangladesh but were eventually repatriated by a Bangladesh-Myanmar

39
See Hannah Ellis-Petersen, From Peace Icon to Pariah: Aung San Suu Kyi’s Fall from Grace,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 23, 2018, 7:19 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/23/aung-san-suukyi-fall-from-grace-myanmar.
40
See Karen McVeigh & Hannah Ellis-Petersen, UN Official Likens Rohingya Living Conditions to
Nazi Concentration Camps, GUARDIAN (July 4, 2019, 6:15 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/201
9/jul/04/un-warns-of-possible-new-war-crimes-in-myanmar.
41
See MARTIN SMITH, STATE OF STRIFE: THE DYNAMICS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT IN BURMA 1 (2007).
42
Id.
43
RICHARD COCKETT, BLOOD, DREAMS AND GOLD: THE CHANGING FACE OF BURMA 9–10 (2015).
44
See id. at 38.
45
Id. at 38–39.
46
See id. at 37.
47
Id. at 38–39.
48
Id. at 39
49
Maung Zarni & Alice Cowley, The Slow-Burning Genocide of Myanmar’s Rohingya, 23 PAC. RIM
L. & POL’Y J. 683, 695, 698 (2014).
50
Id. at 697.
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bilateral treaty in 1978.51 Also during this time, “[a]nti-Rohingya and antiMuslim policy advisers and intellectuals from nationalist Rakhine groups
successfully sought to eliminate the Rohingya from the demographic map of
citizenship through the 1982 Citizenship Act.”52 Discrimination against the
Rohingya escalated in the 1990’s and 2000’s as cycles of severe violence,
flight of the Rohingya to Bangladesh, and repatriation continued.53 Enduring
to the present day, the Muslim Rohingya from the Rakhine State region of
Myanmar face human rights abuses such as severe travel and work
restrictions, denial of citizenship, and ethnic violence.54
A renewed wave of violence against the Rohingya began in 2012 but
intensified on August 25, 2017, following a Rohingya backlash against the
Tatmadaw.55 According to the HRC, “[t]he response of [the Tatmadaw]
security forces, launched within hours, was immediate, brutal and grossly
disproportionate.”56 In what were called “clearance operations,” the
Tatmadaw razed Rohingya villages with intense and indiscriminate weapon
fire, gang raped and murdered Rohingya women and girls, and locked
Rohingya houses before setting them on fire.57 These actions by one ethnic
population against another are reminiscent of those committed during the
Rwandan Genocide and other genocides of the past.
Rohingya women and girls especially face shocking atrocities at the
hands of the Tatmadaw.58 A recent HRC report states:
Rape and other forms of sexual violence were perpetrated on
a massive scale. Large-scale gang rape was perpetrated by
Tatmadaw soldiers in at least 10 village tracts of northern
Rakhine State. Sometimes up to 40 women and girls were
raped or gang-raped together. One survivor stated, “I was
lucky, I was only raped by three men[.]” . . . Rapes were often
in public spaces and in front of families and the community,
maximizing humiliation and trauma. Mothers were gang
raped in front of young children, who were severely injured
and in some instances killed. Women and girls 13 to 25 years
of age were targeted, including pregnant women. Rapes were
51

Id. at 702.
Id. at 697.
See id. at 710–14.
54
Syed S. Mahmood et al., The Rohingya People of Myanmar: Health, Human Rights, and
Identity, 389 THE LANCET 1841, 1842–47 (2017).
55
Report on Myanmar, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 31–32. This HRC report cites the murder and alleged rape
of a Rakhine woman, along with the murder of ten Muslim pilgrims as likely catalysts for the renewed
violence. Id. ¶ 24.
56
Id. at ¶ 33; see also Zarni & Cowley, supra note 50, at 715 (“The 2012 violence saw a mixture of
state authorities, civilian mobs, and local populations killing and engaging in the mass physical destruction
of Rohingya (and other Muslim people, properties, and communities)—effectively enacting pogroms
against the Rohingya.”).
57
Report on Myanmar, supra note 2, at ¶ 36.
58
Report on Myanmar, supra note 2, at ¶ 38.
52
53
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accompanied by derogatory language and threats to life, such
as, “We are going to kill you this way, by raping you.”
Women and girls were systematically abducted, detained and
raped in military and police compounds, often amounting to
sexual slavery. Victims were severely injured before and
during rape, often marked by deep bites. They suffered
serious injuries to reproductive organs, including from rape
with knives and sticks. Many victims were killed or died
from injuries. Survivors displayed signs of deep trauma and
face immense stigma in their community.59
The description of the actions taken against the Rohingya speaks for
itself, and the need for transitional justice mechanisms that will promote
healing and the prevention of future conflict is apparent.
2. The Current Judicial System in Myanmar
Myanmar’s current judiciary system is comprised of a Supreme
Court, 67 District and Self-Administered Area Courts, and 324 Township
Courts.60 Village chiefs are also given considerable “quasi-judicial” power in
investigating and punishing crime.61
Further, Myanmar houses a
Constitutional Court devoted entirely to constitutional issues.62 On its face,
Myanmar’s judiciary is well-developed and prevalent in society.
However, according to a 2012 report by the International Bar
Association’s Human Rights Institute, Myanmar’s judicial system is weighed
down by corruption, over-reaching control by the executive branch, and the
ever-present influence of the state military.63 The report cites a journalist
stating that “the government could always rely on support from the judiciary,
which was inactive and subordinate to the military.”64 Therefore, the
Myanmar judiciary does not conform to the rule of law norms and
expectations of the international community.
That being said, the citizens of Myanmar do not necessarily support
liberal democratic values.65 One writer suggests that Myanmar more closely
follows the idea that “the power of the executive and the judiciary are
designed to work in concert and collaboratively, rather than in opposition to
59

Id.
INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION’S HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE, THE RULE OF LAW IN
MYANMAR: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 56 (2012), https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc
=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=2ahUKEwjO6YKw4fblAhVMuZ4KHbE7AaQQFjAAegQIAxAC&url=htt
ps%3A%2F%2Fwww.ibanet.org%2FDocument%2FDefault.aspx%3FDocumentUid%3DDE0EE11D9878-4685-A20F-9A0AAF6C3F3E&usg=AOvVaw1-bkSyjVbNYNgn6NBqS-dr [hereinafter IBAHRI
REPORT].
61
Id.
62
Id. at 21, 56.
63
See id. at 57–58.
64
Id. at 58.
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Epling, supra note 1, at 130.
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counterbalance one another.”66 Through this discrepancy, the dialectic which
sits as the theme of this Comment comes to light in Myanmar: the
international community prioritizes an independent judiciary as a touchstone
of the rule of law, and the local approach to the judiciary in Myanmar places
lesser emphasis on this independence.
The lack of an impartial and independent judiciary poses a potential
problem for a sustainable rule of law in a country fraught with deep-rooted
discrimination.67 A Myanmar judiciary that takes into account both the
internationally accepted norm of non-discrimination and the domestic
approach to the judiciary will be needed once the conflict between the
Buddhists and the Rohingya comes to an end. To foster such a judiciary in
Myanmar, the international community will need to hold some level of
influence over the justice process which occurs post-conflict. This level of
influence, as discussed below, may arise through the Rule 11 bis mechanism
while also maintaining and respecting the domestic Myanmar approach to
justice.
C. Genocide, the Gacaca Courts, and Rule 11 bis in Rwanda
1. The Rwandan Genocide
In the search for a transitional justice framework for Myanmar, the
history of Rwanda provides a valuable case example. Following the
decolonization and independence of much of the African continent, few
events could parallel the disastrous Rwandan Genocide of 1994.68 The
genocide and ethnic warfare between the Hutu and Tutsi populations shattered
an already delicate political, economic, and social system in Rwanda and left
the shell of a country continuing to recover to this day.69 Following the
atrocities, Rwanda, in concert with the international community, implemented
an international tribunal, national court reform, and grassroots courts, hoping
to foster both justice and healing.70 This Comment utilizes the approaches to
criminal justice in Rwanda due to the similarity between the conflicts in
Rwanda and Myanmar: both involve seemingly unhealable ethnic divides and
truly atrocious crimes between ethnic groups.71 Further, both conflicts involve
decades-enduring violence.72 These similarities allow the analysis of the
successes and failures of the Rwanda approach to inform the possible
implementation of a similar approach in future post-conflict Myanmar.
66

Id. at 131.
See IBAHRI REPORT, supra note 62, at 60.
68
Sosnov, supra note 35, at 125.
69
See generally Phil Clark, Rwanda’s Recovery: When Remembrance is Official Policy, FOREIGN
AFF., https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/rwanda/2017-12-12/rwandas-recovery.
70
Sosnov, supra note 35, at 125, 128–36.
71
See id. at 125; see generally Report on Myanmar, supra note 2.
72
See Sosnov, supra note 35, at 125; see generally Report on Myanmar, supra note 2.
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Although the Rwandan Genocide occurred more than twenty years
ago, the genocide is still fresh in the minds of Rwandan citizens, and societal
and cultural healing has been sluggish.73 To fully appreciate this impact, it is
important to understand the foundation and specific effects of the genocide.
Violence between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups burned for decades before
the beginning of genocide, as these groups vied for political power following
decolonization.74 The Hutu party first rose to social power in 1959 and
initiated the murder of 20,000 Tutsi civilians and the exodus of many others.75
After dramatically rising ethnic tensions and decades of repressive Hutu rule,
the murder of Hutu President Habyarimana by Tutsi rebels in 1994 sparked
the mass killings of the Tutsi people by the Hutu.76 According to the U.N., it
is estimated that more than one million people were killed and 150,000 to
250,000 women were raped; unsurprisingly, the long-standing effects of this
genocidal atrocity remain obvious in Rwandan society as the country
struggles to move on from the all-consuming tragedy.77
2. Post-Conflict Courts and Judicial Mechanisms in Rwanda
The post-conflict judicial environment in Rwanda involved several
levels of courts, including grassroots courts, national courts, and an
international tribunal.78 This section will briefly introduce each level in turn.
To encourage post-genocide healing, the Rwandan gacaca courts
were established.79 These courts involved local judges chosen by the
community publicly trying the accused according to the community’s own
standards.80 “Gacaca is a traditional, community-based restorative justice
institution . . . that requires the members of Rwandese society to communicate
with the State and with one another about the sensitive subject of the
genocide.”81 These courts could be rightly categorized as a mixture of the
strict criminal prosecution and the cathartic truth commission; the gacaca
courts encouraged civic participation while holding the government
accountable, an important rule of law ideal.82 That being said, the system was
not without its problems, which will be discussed below.
73

See generally Clark, supra note 71.
Max Rettig, Gacaca: Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation in Postconflict Rwanda?, 51 AFR. STUD.
REV. 25, 29 (2008).
75
Id.
76
Rwanda: A Brief History of the Country, U.N., https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda
/historical-background.shtml (last visited May 16, 2021); see also George S. Yacoubian, Jr., The Efficacy
of International Criminal Justice: Evaluating the Aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide, 4 WORLD
AFFS. 186, 187 (1999).
77
See Rwanda: A Brief History of the Country, supra note 78.
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Sosnov, supra note 35, at 125, 128–36.
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Rettig, supra note 76, at 30.
80
Id. at 31.
81
Aneta Wierzynska, Consolidating Democracy Through Transitional Justice: Rwanda’s Gacaca
Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1934, 1939 (2004) (emphasis added).
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Functioning at the state-level, national courts in Rwanda struggled to
handle the sheer volume of cases which resulted from the genocide.83 Even
further, no legislation existed concerning crimes against humanity and
genocide, and the national courts therefore had no law to apply.84 In an
attempt to reform the justice system to address these defects, the Rwandan
government passed the Organic Law on the Organization of Prosecutions for
Offences Constituting the Crimes of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity
Committed since 1 October 1990 and formed special chambers for genocide
and crimes against humanity cases.85 Although backed by theoreticallyequipped substantive law, these chambers suffered from a lack of prosecutors,
defense attorneys, and judges, resulting in few truly fair trials.86 For example,
“[s]ome of the first trials involved multiple defendants, were openly biased
against the defendants, and lasted only a few hours.”87 These serious due
process and rule of law transgressions supported the international
community’s push for an international tribunal to judge the perpetrators.88
In November 1994, the United Nations Security Council established
the ICTR.89 The tribunal was established “for the sole purpose of prosecuting
persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens
responsible for genocide and other such violations.”90 Although the tribunal
did achieve its mandate to some extent, an arguably more crucial contribution
to the international order was the development of international criminal
jurisprudence and case law.91 Part of this jurisprudence involved the
establishment of a relationship between the international tribunal and
Rwandan national courts.92 Importantly, the ICTR held concurrent
jurisdiction with Rwandan national courts, meaning that both could prosecute
genocide and crimes against humanity.93 But, the ICTR held “primacy over
the national courts of all States.”94 The dynamics of this jurisdictional
83
Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rwandan National Justice System in Dealing with the Mass Atrocities of
1994, 18 B. U. INT’L L. J. 163, 187 (2000); Carla J. Ferstman, Domestic Trials for Genocide and Crimes
Against Humanity: The Example of Rwanda, 9 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 857, 862 (1997).
84
Carroll, supra note 85, at 187.
85
Id.; Ferstman, supra note 85, at 863.
86
Carroll, supra note 85, at 188.
87
Id. at 189.
88
Id. at 193 (“[O]ne of the reasons the ICTR was created was to compensate for the inability of the
Rwandan courts to fairly try those responsible for serious human rights violations without delay.”).
89
Amelia S. Canter, Note, “For These Reasons, the Chamber: Denies the Prosecutor’s Request for
Referral”: The False Hope of Rule 11 BIS, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1614, 1620 (2009); see generally S.C.
Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994). The tribunal was established despite several concerns by the Rwandan
government, including that the tribunal would be underfunded and understaffed and that the tribunal could
only try crimes which occurred during the year of 1994. Canter, supra note 91, at 1619.
90
S.C. Res. 955, supra note 91, ¶ 1.
91
Palmer, supra note 17, at 5–6.
92
See id. at 9 (discussing Rule 11 bis and corresponding case law).
93
S.C. Res. 955, supra note 91, art. 8, ¶ 1; see generally Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent
Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 349 (1997).
94
S.C. Res. 955, supra note 91, art. 8, ¶ 2.
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relationship are mirrored in a procedural rule for the ICTR—Rule 11 bis.95
Rule 11 bis was used in concert with the gacaca courts and other
domestic national courts in Rwanda in an attempt to reconcile the
international and the domestic.96 Rule 11 bis, found in the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence for the ICTR, holds the title “Referral of the Indictment to
another Court.”97 Its text reads as follows:
(A) If an indictment has been confirmed, whether or not the
accused is in the custody of the Tribunal, the President may
designate a Trial Chamber which shall determine whether the
case should be referred to the authorities of a State:
(i) in whose territory the crime was committed; or
(ii) in which the accused was arrested; or
(iii) having jurisdiction and being willing and
adequately prepared to accept such a case,
so that those authorities should forthwith refer the case to the
appropriate court for trial within that State.
(B) The Trial Chamber may order such referral proprio motu
or at the request of the Prosecutor, after having given to the
Prosecutor and, where the accused is in the custody of the
Tribunal, the accused, the opportunity to be heard.
(C) In determining whether to refer the case in accordance
with paragraph (A), the Trial Chamber shall satisfy itself that
the accused will receive a fair trial in the courts of the State
concerned and that the death penalty will not be imposed or
carried out.
(D) Where an order is issued pursuant to this Rule:
(i) the accused, if in the custody of the Tribunal, shall
be handed over to the authorities of the State
concerned;
(ii) the Trial Chamber may order that protective
measures for certain witnesses or victims remain in
force;
(iii) the Prosecutor shall provide to the authorities of
the State concerned all of the information relating to
95

See Palmer, supra note 17, at 8.
Id. at 13.
97
ICTR R. P. & EVID. 11 bis (last amended May 13, 2015), https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/
files/legal-library/150513-rpe-en-fr.pdf [hereinafter ICTR RULE 11 bis].
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the case which the Prosecutor considers appropriate
and, in particular, the material supporting the
indictment;
(iv) the Prosecutor may, and if the Trial Chamber so
orders, the Registrar shall, send observers to monitor
the proceedings in the State concerned. The
observers shall report, respectively, to the
Prosecutor, or through the Registrar to the President.
(E) The Trial Chamber may issue a warrant for the arrest of
the accused, which shall specify the State to which he is to be
transferred for trial.
(F) At any time after an order has been issued pursuant to this
Rule and before the accused is found guilty or acquitted by a
court in the State concerned, the Trial Chamber may proprio
motu or at the request of the Prosecutor and upon having
given to the authorities of the State concerned the opportunity
to be heard, revoke the order and make a formal request for
deferral within the terms of Rule 10.
(G) Where an order issued pursuant to this Rule is revoked
by the Trial Chamber, it may make a formal request to the
State concerned to transfer the accused to the seat of the
Tribunal, and the State shall accede to such a request without
delay in keeping with Article 28 of the Statute. The Trial
Chamber or a Judge may also issue a warrant for the arrest of
the accused.
(H) An appeal by the accused or the Prosecutor shall lie as of
right from a decision of the Trial Chamber whether or not to
refer a case. Notice of appeal shall be filed within fifteen
days of the decision unless the accused was not present or
represented when the decision was pronounced, in which
case the time-limit shall run from the date on which the
accused is notified of the decision.98
Not unique to the Rwanda context, Rule 11 bis was a mechanism also
used in Yugoslavia for ending drawn-out international criminal tribunals.99
As the ICTR and ICTY neared the end of their limited terms of operation, the
tribunals similarly needed to complete more cases.100 Thus, the primary
function of Rule 11 bis generally was “freeing up precious Tribunal time,”
98

Id.
ICTY R. P. & EVID. 11 bis (last amended July 8, 2015), https://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Lib
rary/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032Rev50_en.pdf [hereinafter ICTY RULE 11 bis].
100
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not emphasizing the “involvement of the national courts in prosecuting and
trying persons responsible for blatant violations of humanitarian and human
rights law.”101 That being said, an important effect of the implementation of
Rule 11 bis was “enhancing the national capacity to prosecute the most
serious international crimes.”102 In other words, although a mutualistic
relationship between the international tribunal and the domestic court was not
the primarily-intended consequence of Rule 11 bis, such a relationship arose
and allowed for some progress toward a balance between international and
domestic approaches to justice.
Several sections of this Rule warrant special attention in the context
of the international-domestic/ethnocentric-cultural relativist dialectic.103
First, Section (B) “provides that referral may be initiated . . . by the Referral
Bench, or at the request of the Prosecutor.”104 Importantly, the defendant and
the state which might want jurisdiction over the case do not have standing to
request the case be referred to that state.105 Therefore, the international
tribunal solely holds the discretionary power to refer a case to a national
court.106 Next, Section (C) requires the Tribunal Trial Chamber to determine
whether a fair trial will be carried out in the national court and to ensure the
death penalty will not be enforced there.107 This section appears to ensure that
fair trials and the prohibition of the death penalty are upheld even if a case is
removed from international jurisdiction.108 Finally, Section (D) prescribes
additional measures for the Tribunal, Referral Bench, and Prosecutor of the
ICTR to monitor national judicial proceedings so that under the authority
provided by Sections (F) and (G) the Trial Court may revoke the referral order
and return the case to proceedings before the ICTR on the international
level.109 These sections allow international oversight such that “[s]tates
wishing to avoid having the case removed from their national courts . . . are
more likely to abide by international standards.”110 Through the sections
mentioned, Rule 11 bis bridged the gap between international and national
courts involved in post-conflict justice.
In the Rwandan context specifically, Rule 11 bis allowed the transfer
101

Bekou, supra note 16, at 726.
Id. at 728.
103
Although the texts of Rule 11 bis in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTR and that of
the ICTY are not identical, the language of Sections (A)-(B) and (D)-(E) are substantially similar. See
ICTR RULE 11 bis, supra note 99; ICTY RULE 11 bis, supra note 101. Rather than addressing fair trials
and the death penalty, Section (C) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY states that the
Referral Bench shall “consider the gravity of the crimes charged and the level of responsibility of the
accused.” See ICTR RULE 11 bis, supra note 99; ICTY RULE 11 bis, supra note 101.
104
Susan Somers, Rule 11 of bis of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia:
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of “intermediate and lower-ranking accused already indicted by the Tribunal
‘to competent national jurisdictions, as appropriate, including Rwanda.’”111
Although the gacaca courts were an important local part of transitional justice
in Rwanda, these courts were often spurned in the Rule 11 bis context in favor
of the more established national courts.112 Thus, transfers between the ICTR
and Rwandan courts perhaps aided in establishing the legitimacy of the
Rwandan national courts in the international gaze but did little to uphold the
expectations of the local people in terms of the justice they expected to
receive.113 These issues, and others, will be more fully developed in the
analysis portion of this Comment.
III. ANALYSIS
This Comment will now expand upon the information portrayed in
Part II to synthesize a suggested transitional justice framework for Myanmar.
The analysis will address the successes and failures of both the gacaca courts
and the Rule 11 bis mechanism in Rwanda and ultimately illustrate how an
understanding of these successes and failures may be applied to a future postconflict Myanmar.
A. The Successes and Failures of the Gacaca Courts in Rwanda
The gacaca courts contributed to transitional justice of Rwanda in
that they attempted to expose the truth of the atrocities that occurred, gave
victims a healing platform on which to speak, and promoted community
restoration as justice was pursued through speaking and understanding.114
Further, the gacaca courts were centers for the Rwandan local sense of
justice; they elevated the importance of exposing the tragedies that occurred
over the issuance of objectively just consequences.115 Through this elevation
of local justice, the gacaca courts are an example of a culturally relativist
approach to transitional justice.
Despite, and perhaps as a result of, their therapeutic ends, the gacaca
courts did little to promote a sustainable rule of law.116 Few rights were given
to the accused, as the “courts” were primarily a place for victims to speak.117
111

Palmer, supra note 17, at 8.
Id. at 17–18.
See id. at 16, 19 (noting that, while the ICTR was theoretically willing to transfer cases to Rwandan
national courts, it was not willing to transfer cases to the gacaca courts––the courts with which local people
most often engaged).
114
See Sosnov, supra note 35, at 136–40, 142–45.
115
See Rettig, supra note 76, at 39. “[Gacaca confessions] were meant to give solace to survivors and
heal the community by exposing how loved ones died and encouraging perpetrators to apologize.” Id. That
being said, “nearly 40 percent of the time judges deem confessions incomplete and impose prison terms at
or near the maximum—on average, twenty-five years.” Id.
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(2009).
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Due to the lack of an ascertainable standard of justice, witnesses would
sometimes fear retaliatory physical harm if they spoke in support of a
defendant.118 As a result, the gacaca courts were looked down upon by those
involved in the international courts as a significant factor undermining
international justice.119 Although not comprehensive of all successes and
failures of the gacaca courts, this section will expand upon those most
relevant to the future processes at issue in Myanmar.
Invaluable to Rwandan history through their role in post-conflict
community restoration, the gacaca courts were unique and ambitious in many
ways, and their successes and failures contribute to a greater understanding
of the role of local courts in transitional justice.120 The Rwandan government
conceived the gacaca courts in 1999 and articulated the following five
objectives for them:
(1) “to reveal the truth about what has happened;” (2) “to
speed up the genocide trials;” (3) “to eradicate the culture of
impunity;” (4) “to reconcile the Rwandans and reinforce their
unity;” and (5) “to prove that Rwandan society has the
capacity to settle its own problems through a system of
justice based on the Rwandan custom.”121
These five goals were somewhat met by the gacaca courts, although the
glaring flaws of the process admittedly came to light as the courts
progressed.122
First and foremost, the gacaca courts focused on the exposition of
truth and a full understanding of the actions which led to the need for the
trial.123 This emphasis on garnering the full impact of a defendant’s actions
shifted the proceedings away from those of a typical trial—“[u]nlike
traditional criminal trials, in which the goal is to prosecute an individual for
the crimes he committed . . . gacaca focuses on the effect of the suspect’s
actions on the community and invites testimony from every person affected
by the crime.”124 Defendants in gacaca proceedings were “given shorter
sentences in exchange for confessing and [were] encouraged to seek
forgiveness from the victim’s family. Survivors, in return, [could] finally

L.J. 159, 168 (2017); see also Rettig, supra note 76, at 26 (“Lack of defense counsel and other protections
for the accused raise doubts about gacaca’s compliance with international norms.”); Sosnov, supra note
35, at 136.
118
Sosnov, supra note 35, at 138.
119
See Palmer, supra note 17, at 17.
120
See Rettig, supra note 76, at 25.
121
Sosnov, supra note 35, at 134, 136 (quoting The Objectives of the Gacaca Courts, NAT’L SERV. OF
GACACA JURISDICTIONS, http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/En/EnObjectives.htm (last visited Apr. 20,
2008)).
122
See id. at 136–47.
123
Id. at 136.
124
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discover the fate of their loved ones.”125 These tactics did not only expose the
truth of the atrocities but also promoted healing and unity in some Rwandan
communities—a major feat.126 According to a study conducted in 2006 and
2007, the Sovu community embraced the gacaca courts and experienced
some positive social trends as a result.127 For example, “[a] cabaret (bar) in
Sovu is likely to be packed—on any given day, at any given time—by both
Hutus and Tutsis.”128 Thus, it would seem as though ethnic divides that had
once spawned genocide were, in some circumstances, repaired through truthseeking and reconciliation gacaca processes.129
Moreover, the gacaca courts encouraged the development of
democracy and the rule of law in Rwanda, despite the courts’ atypical
approach to a trial.130 One scholar argues that “[g]acaca’s procedural
dependence on public participation has made it a forum in which speech is
relatively free and protected.”131 Further, she notes that gacaca created a
“critical communication bridge between the people and the State that did not
exist before.”132 Importantly, the World Justice Project lists two of the Four
Universal Principles of the rule of law as “Open Government” and
“Accessible and Impartial Dispute Resolution.”133 Free speech in judicial
forums and communication between the Rwandan government and its people
advance these two universal principles of the rule of law, assisting in the
creation of a sustainable rule of law.134
Notwithstanding the successes in community restoration and
democracy development, the gacaca courts were clouded by what many in
the Rwandan community and the international community considered fatal
flaws.135 Obvious flaws included the lack of an accused’s right to counsel and
the right to confront their accusers.136 Another major flaw was the view that
the gacaca courts were heavily biased against the Hutus—labelled in a
blanketed fashion as the “perpetrators”—while the Tutsis were portrayed as
“faultless victims.”137 Several factors contributed to this view, such as the
125
Gacaca Courts, N.Y. TIMES: SCHOTT’S VOCAB (Jan. 20, 2010, 4:34 AM), https://schott.blogs.
nytimes.com/2010/01/20/gacaca-courts/.
126
Rettig, supra note 76, at 39.
127
Id. at 27, 29.
128
Id. at 36. Further, “[m]ore than 95 percent of Sovu residents report having shared a drink with a
member of another ethnic group within the month prior to the interview; two-thirds of the 95 percent say
that they did so out of friendship.” Id.
129
See id.
130
See Wierzynska, supra note 83, at 1947.
131
Id. at 1958.
132
Id.
133
What is the Rule of Law?, WORLD JUST. PROJECT, https://worldjusticeproject.org/aboutus/overview/what-rule-law (last visited May 16, 2021).
134
See Wierzynska, supra note 83, at 1958 (“[O]pen discussion of differences is apt to promote public
autonomy[.] These characteristics fall squarely within civic culture.”).
135
See generally Sosnov, supra note 35, at 138–53.
136
Theiring, supra note 119, at 168.
137
Sosnov, supra note 35, at 139.
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governmental practice of trying only Hutu crimes in gacaca courts and the
acceptance of false or insufficient evidence as the basis for a conviction.138
At the same time, crimes committed by the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front
(“RPF”) government, the group which ultimately ended the genocide, went
unaddressed.139 This blatant bias inherent to the gacaca process resulted in a
diminishment of public trust in the RPF government and in the reconciliation
process as a whole.140
Finally, the gacaca courts were overshadowed by a cloud of fear felt
by many parties: by defendants who did not want to participate in required
accusations of their friends and family; by witnesses who feared reprisals by
the past perpetrators; by non-victims who believed they would be accused of
a crime themselves if they testified in favor of someone accused; and by rape
victims who believed that they would be ostracized and become “ineligible to
marry” if they testified.141 This fear to speak the truth does not characterize a
tribunal as successful in the endeavors of reconciliation and rule of law
development, and herein lie the major problems with the gacaca court system.
Although the gacaca courts’ emphases on legitimizing the voice of the victim
and shedding light on past crimes pursued community healing and forgiveness
in theory, the government did not execute the trials in a way which fostered
healing beneath the surface-level.142 As discussed below, the implementation
of non-invasive international monitoring may mitigate the failures of the
Rwandan gacaca-style courts in the context of Myanmar.
B. The Successes and Failures of the Implementation of Rule 11 bis in
Rwanda
In many circumstances in which an international court tries cases
involving domestic crimes, especially contentious crimes involving trauma
and violence, the victims and other citizens of the nations at issue feel a sense
of disconnect between the crimes they experienced and the actual process of
justice.143 The Rule 11 bis system of interaction between international and
domestic courts was considered a theoretically effective way to bridge the gap
and send medium to low-level criminals back to national courts to be tried.144
Further, the Rule contained a provision that allowed the international tribunal
to “recall” the case should it not progress in a satisfactory way in the national

138
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court.145 The Rule also required that the ICTR chamber consider the laws
governing the domestic trials before the case was transferred to assure the
protection of rights throughout the proceedings.146
Theoretically, the Rule provided for the balance of the dialectic which
this Comment pursues. For the most serious cases of crimes against
humanity, prevailing international norms of justice could be applied by the
ICTR.147 For lesser cases, Rwandan cultural norms and local ideas of justice
could be upheld should the Rwandan laws provide a base-level fair trial.148
And should the national court fail, the case could be recalled to the
international level.149 In practice, though, this balance weighed much more
heavily on the primacy of international norms.150 This section will outline the
realistic application of Rule 11 bis to Rwanda.
Following the inclusion of Rule 11 bis in the ICTR Rules of
Evidence, the ICTR considered two seminal cases regarding Rule 11 bis
referrals: Prosecutor v. Munyakazi (“Munyakazi”) and Prosecutor v.
Kanyarukiga (“Kanyarukiga”).151 These cases generally represented the
concerns of the ICTR and why the ICTR ultimately pursued a trend of denying
Rule 11 bis transfers, undercutting the original purpose of the Rule.152
Scholars have generally identified these concerns as revolving around
Rwandan laws, penalties for crimes, and the occurrence of fair trials.153
Regarding national laws, Rule 11 bis required that the state in
question have competent jurisdiction over the defendant before the
consideration of other transfer decision factors; a large component of
jurisdiction is a system of laws which actually criminalizes the defendant’s
behavior.154 Generally, both the Munyakazi and the Kanyarukiga Chambers
decided that “there existed a sufficient legal framework [in Rwanda] to try the
defendant for genocide and crimes against humanity” because they
progressed into discussions of Rwanda’s capacity to conduct fair trials and
145
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the relevant penalties that would be imposed.155 A “sufficient” legal
framework, though, was not necessarily enough to pass muster in front of the
Chambers, as both international standards for punishment and fair trials
needed to be met.156
Problematic to Rule 11 bis Section (C), which states that the death
penalty should not be carried out in the national jurisdiction, Rwanda passed
the Death Penalty Law in 2007, which substituted the death penalty with “life
imprisonment or life imprisonment with special provisions.”157 Article 4 of
the Death Penalty Law provides that the “special provisions” could include
solitary confinement for life, a sentence found inconsistent with international
human rights standards by the Chambers for both Munyakazi and
Kanyarukiga.158 When this argument was presented by the defendants in
opposition to the Rule 11 bis transfer to Rwanda, Rwanda argued in return
that they had recently instituted the Transfer Law; in an effort to facilitate
more Rule 11 bis transfers to Rwanda, the Transfer Law provided that the
maximum possible sentence for transfer cases was life imprisonment with no
special provisions.159 Rwanda further offered for their legislature to officially
interpret the Transfer Law as stipulating such.160 Despite these assurances,
the Munyakazi and Kanyarukiga Appeals Chambers both held:
Since there is genuine ambiguity about which punishment
provision would apply to transfer cases, and since, therefore,
the possibility exists that Rwandan courts might hold that a
penalty of life imprisonment in isolation would apply to such
cases . . . the current penalty structure in Rwanda is not
adequate for the purposes of transfer under Rule 11bis . . . .161
Thus, the ICTR rejected the transfers due to Rwanda’s penalty system and
refused to give Rwanda the benefit of the doubt regarding their efforts to
conform to international standards.162
Issues involving the dialectic between international norms and
national practice arose upon the ICTR evaluation of the Rwandan criminal
law system. For example, in deciding whether to transfer cases, the ICTR
looked to briefs presented by international organizations assessing the
Rwandan procedural justice laws, rather than just to the laws themselves.163
155
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157
Canter, supra note 91, at 1634.
158
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at ¶ 16.
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The decision to look at materials outside of Rwandan written legislation
shifted away from ICTY jurisprudence, which required courts to only look at
the “State’s relevant legislation when determining whether an accused would
receive a fair trial in that State.”164 Rather than follow this jurisprudence, the
ICTR chose to look to the experience of the ICTR defense counsel and two
briefs submitted by Human Rights Watch and the International Criminal
Defence Attorneys Association.165 These groups uphold international
standards for criminal law and judicial development, and they concluded in
their briefs that these standards would not be upheld if the cases were
transferred to Rwandan national courts.166 By giving preferential treatment
to the reports of international groups over the efforts of Rwanda itself, the
ICTR elevated the international perspective over the Rwandan local
perspective and arguably undermined the development and practice of
transitional justice in Rwanda, which Rwanda seemed eager to accomplish.167
Moreover, regarding Rwanda’s capacity to ensure a fair trial, the
ICTR considered whether the Rwandan judicial system proffered sufficient
judicial independence and the right to call witnesses for the defense.168 In
Munyakazi, the Court considered whether Rwanda’s judicial practice of
adjudicating serious violations in a High Court with a single judge and the
government’s known influence over the judiciary indicated Rwanda’s lack of
an independent judiciary.169 Despite these concerns, the Appellate Chambers
noted that the numerical composition of the Rwandan High Court could not
be a dispositive reason not to transfer a case and that the evidence of executive
interference with the judiciary did not outweigh the safeguards Rwanda put
in place to guarantee judicial independence.170 As a result, the Appellate
Chambers opined that “no reasonable Trial Chamber would have concluded
that there was sufficient risk of government interference with the Rwandan
judiciary to warrant denying the Prosecution’s request to transfer Munyakazi
to Rwanda.”171 Therefore, this factor weighed in favor of transfer.172
Finally, perhaps the most damning factor regarding potential transfers
to Rwanda was Rwandan defense counsel’s de facto inability to call witnesses
at trial in Rwandan courts.173 As discussed previously, potential witnesses in
trials regarding the genocide were reluctant to testify due to fear.174
164
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Recognizing this fear, the Appellate Chambers for both Munyakazi and
Kanyarukiga discussed the “harassment of witnesses testifying in Rwanda,
and that witnesses who have given evidence . . . experienced threats, torture,
arrests and detentions, and, in some instances, were killed.”175 In concluding
that evidence of this harassment was credible and indicative of a defendant’s
ability to call witnesses, the Chambers again relied upon the briefs submitted
by international organizations.176 Attempting to mitigate this issue, Rwanda
incorporated a strengthening of its witness protection program into the
Transfer Law.177 Again, the ICTR considered the assurances by Rwanda to
be merely “theoretical” and the program to be insufficient.178
Further addressing Rwandan issues with witness fear, the ICTR
undermined the gacaca system in Rwanda, using the local courts as a factor
“that lead the ICTR to refuse transfer on the grounds of the accused’s inability
to raise an effective defen[s]e.”179 The ICTR based this assessment on the fact
that gacaca was understood to spawn arbitrary arrest and harassment due to
the biased nature of the courts.180 In reaching this conclusion, the ICTR
refused to engage with the potential successes of the localized and more
informal court system.181 This refusal illustrates the tension that exists
between international and local conceptions of justice and, as scholars argue,
may have negatively impacted the ICTR’s ability to fairly and knowledgeably
adjudicate requests for Rule 11 bis transfers.182
Overall, the reality of Rule 11 bis in the context of the ICTR did not
align with the process in theory. Rather than creating balance and mutual
understanding between the international and local approaches to justice, the
ICTR Rule 11 bis proceedings arguably exacerbated the disconnect in that the
ICTR gave little leeway to Rwanda in implementing international norms and
failed to promote the development of the rule of law and justice in postconflict Rwanda.
C. Application of Lessons Learned to the Unique Situation in Myanmar
Taking into account the successes and failures of the gacaca courts
and of Rule 11 bis in Rwanda, a better combination of these two concepts
must be implemented in Myanmar when the time for post-conflict transitional
justice mechanisms approaches. This better implementation would include
175
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institutional reform in the judiciary so that gacaca-type courts could
effectively pursue truth and the rule of law in tandem; a more culturally
sensitive approach to Rule 11 bis so that an international tribunal is willing to
work more closely with the national courts of Myanmar; and a system of
international monitoring to ensure that Myanmar protects the most basic
rights, such as those ensuring fair trials for the accused.
As mentioned previously, Rwanda is a valuable case example through
which to view the situation in Myanmar due to the similar nature of the
conflicts.183 The gacaca approach in Rwanda could help to heal the ethnic
divides that Myanmar is facing by allowing more truth-telling, if the process
is implemented more successfully than it was in Rwanda. Many more cases
were heard in the Rwanda gacaca courts than in their national courts because
the gacaca process was more informal.184 In Myanmar both the Tatmadaw
and the Rohingya military forces, known as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation
Army (“ARSA”), have committed large-scale human rights abuses.185 Thus,
international and national courts for Myanmar would need to hold many trials
to process the many grievances. Given the widespread nature of the atrocities
in Myanmar, an informal process like the gacaca courts could allow for
expedited ethnic and religious healing.
Of course, Myanmar would need to address the issues that arose in
the implementation of gacaca in Rwanda. For example, future truth-telling
courts in Myanmar must ensure the components of a fair trial: a lack of bias
toward one side or the other (Buddhist v. Muslim), a defendant’s right to
counsel, and a defendant’s right to face their accusers.186 Fortunately, the
Myanmar Constitution provides for an independent and lawful judiciary,
justice in an open court, and a guarantee of the rights of defense and appeal.187
Myanmar, therefore, already has the guarantees structurally in its laws.188
Granted, the implementation of these guarantees must occur, but the outlook
has improved in recent years, as procedural abuses, like secret trials and
punitive transfers to remote facilities, “are currently rare or non-existent.”189
Moreover, the international community could implement non-invasive
monitoring procedures to ensure that, in the gacaca-like courts, the issuance
of a sentence conforms with formal requirements of fairness and defense
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witnesses do not fear testifying.190 These monitoring procedures could result
in reports and encourage institutional reform in Myanmar’s judiciary, as well
as monitor cases which may be transferred from an international tribunal
through Rule 11 bis.191
As stated already, Myanmar has a large judicial system, and some
“judicial” proceedings are operated by tribal leaders.192 These tribal leaders
are regulated by the government through the Ward or Village Tract
Administration Act of 2012, which requires the election of these tribal village
officials by secret ballot.193 This system is well-suited for the gacaca-type
trials because each village community already has an elected official that
could serve as the adjudicator and facilitator of a gacaca-type hearing.194 As
a caveat, lustration of officials is often needed in post-conflict transitional
societies to effectuate true institutional reform.195 The international
community, through the United Nations, could aid Myanmar in implementing
a lustration program to ensure that judges in gacaca-type courts are unbiased
and effective, removing those who were largely complicit in the conflict. 196
In this way, Myanmar could progress in the transitional justice areas of
criminal proceedings and institutional reform through gacaca-like
proceedings.
Further learning from Rwanda, Myanmar could utilize the Rule 11
bis mechanism in an international tribunal setting. The ICC would likely
serve as the international tribunal by which the atrocities committed by
individuals are addressed; as discussed previously, the ICC was created in
response to the ICTR and ICTY but faces many potential pitfalls as an
arguably ethnocentric body.197 Moreover, the ICC must learn from the lessons
190
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more willing to rely on monitoring mechanisms and give Rwanda the benefit of the doubt, they ultimately
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of implementing Rule 11 bis in Rwanda and commit itself to diligently
working with the Myanmar government to facilitate successful transfers.
Generally, this commitment would look like the following: (1) a greater
willingness by the international community to engage with Myanmar’s local
judicial norms and traditions; (2) a strict resolution to adjudicate the most
serious offenders at the international level to affirm international rebuke of
genocidal crimes; and (3) a commitment to refer lesser crimes to local courts.
Addressing the first component of the ICC’s commitment to
facilitating a Rule 11 bis-like transfer mechanism, the international
community must be willing to bridge the dialectical gap between international
norms and local conceptions of justice to facilitate a rule of law practice that
will be sustainable in the Myanmar social and political climate. In the ICTR
transfer decisions, the Appeals Chambers refused to grant Rule 11 bis
referrals because they did not believe Rwanda would be able to implement
the high international standards for penalties and fair trials.198 Rather than
granting the benefit of the doubt to a country struggling to recover from
atrocity, the ICTR expected Rwanda to have international norms and
guarantees firmly in place.199 Moreover, because the ICTR refused to grant
these transfers, Rwanda was unable to use these cases to build their rule of
law capacities and reputation.200 When Myanmar approaches a post-conflict
environment, the ICC should take a different approach and put a higher degree
of trust in the Myanmar government’s efforts—mitigated, of course, by
international monitoring.
In Myanmar, the judiciary and the executive are more closely
connected than deemed acceptable by the international community; although
the people of Myanmar support the idea of an independent judiciary and
democracy in theory, they also show a lowered appreciation for more liberal
democratic values.201 Therefore, while a truly independent judiciary is
arguably possible in Myanmar, the present “societal value of order” and the
Myanmar citizens’ “support [of] highly authoritarian ideals with regards to
other social and political dynamics” makes a concerted movement by
Myanmar toward a truly independent judiciary unlikely.202 Rather than
Gambia v. Myanmar) (Jan. 23, 2020). It then required Myanmar to take provisional measures to preserve
evidence of genocidal wrongdoing as the case progresses. Id. The case will progress in the coming year,
as The Gambia must submit a written memorial by July 3, 2020, and Myanmar must respond by January
23, 2021. Id. Unfortunately, there is no way to ensure that Myanmar complies with the provisional
order. Id.
198
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endeavor to force Myanmar into a large cultural shift, the international
community should recognize that the judiciary may be influenced by the
ideals put forth by the powerful executive. The judiciary and the executive in
Myanmar may work closely together; however, the international community
need not balk at this “rule of law” transgression unless there is evidence that
fair trials are not occurring.203 Thus, the international community can feel
secure in their implementation of a supervision system to warrant the
occurrence of fair trials.
Turning to the second and third components of the ICC’s
commitment to facilitating Rule 11 bis-like transfers, the ICC must evaluate
which cases are severe enough that they must be tried at the international
level, facilitate the transfer of less serious cases to the larger national courts
and military tribunals in Myanmar, and provide guidance and support for the
gacaca-type courts. The trial of large players involved in the Myanmar
atrocities would likely be kept in the jurisdiction of the ICC following the
rationale of Rule 11 bis Section (A)(iii) because these trials would be
important opportunities for the international community to strongly articulate
international law concerning genocide and crimes against humanity.204
Indeed, the ICTR served largely “as a means of establishing an international
system of criminal justice for violations of humanitarian law.”205
Despite the benefits of developing a robust collection of international
criminal law regarding these types of crimes, the ICC for Myanmar must
successfully transfer cases to the Myanmar national courts through a Rule 11
bis-like mechanism. This transfer would be encouraged by the fact that Rule
11 bis provides for international monitoring procedures and the possibility for
revocation of the transfer should the national adjudications proceed in blatant
opposition to the notion of a fair trial.206 Admittedly, the international
community would need to be heavily involved through supervision to ensure
that the Myanmar military is not exerting undue discriminatory influence over
the judicial proceedings.207 But, this sort of supervision need not place
international norms in superiority over the local.
Lastly, the ICC and the international community as a whole must not
dismiss gacaca-type proceedings in Myanmar as they did, on the whole, in
Rwanda.208 This dismissal demoralized the success of these grassroots courts
and characterized the Rwandan approach to justice as “undermin[ing]
international justice.”209 In contrast, as argued by one scholar, the ICC,
national-level courts, and gacaca-type proceedings “could complement one
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
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another, with the [international tribunal] contributing to a global legal order,
the national courts to developing domestic professional capacity and gacaca
to providing a locali[z]ed mechanism of accountability.”210 By using this
approach, each court system could pursue common goals of transitional
justice and sustainable rule of law development in Myanmar while also
pursuing tailored objectives.211 Moreover, Myanmar could utilize the
ethnocentrism-cultural relativism dialectic to its advantage by equally
prioritizing international human rights norms and domestic cultural values in
the gacaca, national, and international court levels. Myanmar may thus create
a more sustainable post-conflict rule of law framework by avoiding the
problems which arise from favoring one side of the dialectic over the other.
IV. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding this Comment’s discussion, there will certainly be
limitations to the application of the transitional justice framework to
Myanmar. For example, the ethnic and religious divides between the minority
Muslims and the majority Buddhists are deeply and historically rooted.212 It
is highly probable that the government and institutions in Myanmar are
inherently discriminatory toward Muslims.213 Further, the extremely antiMuslim Myanmar military holds a great amount of power and influence in the
country—to the point at which some argue the current government in
Myanmar is simply a puppet regime for the military.214 These factors hinder
the likelihood of success for transitional justice mechanisms like gacaca-style
courts and Rule 11 bis. Until the time arrives when Myanmar is truly postconflict regarding the atrocities against the Rohingya, it will be impossible to
tell exactly how these processes should be implemented. Still, understanding
the dialectic between ethnocentric and culturally relativist approaches to the
rule of law and transitional justice will be paramount to the healing of postconflict Myanmar, and the lessons learned from the experiences of postconflict countries like Rwanda are invaluable to this process.
In an effort to propose a sustainable rule of law framework for a postconflict judiciary in Myanmar, this Comment illustrated the similarities
between the genocide which occurred in Rwanda in the 1990’s and the current
violence perpetrated by the Rakhine Buddhists against the Rohingya Muslims
in Myanmar.215 Both conflicts involve deep-rooted divides and hatred,
whether ethnic or religious, and were the result of many decades of violence
210
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and repression of one party.216 Further, in post-conflict Rwanda, the country
experienced local grassroots courts, national courts, and an international
tribunal.217 The similarities between the conflicts and the use of a wide range
of post-conflict judiciaries in Rwanda allow the Rwanda example to serve as
a valuable tool in the eventual post-conflict Myanmar context.
An example of culturally relativist justice, the gacaca courts in
Rwanda were a setting for truth-telling and healing according to the customs
of the Rwandan local sense of justice.218 Often absent from these courts,
though, was a sustainable rule of law in that crucial elements of due process
were lacking: right to counsel, right to confront one’s accusers, and nonbiased adjudicators.219 Further, witnesses often feared becoming a social
pariah in their communities if they testified.220 In the Myanmar context, these
issues must be prevented, but the potential for this prevention in Myanmar is
promising. Myanmar already has a judicial system in place, incorporating
local tribal leaders, which would be well-suited for gacaca-style
proceedings.221 The international community could also aid in the observance
of these proceedings to ensure fairness and due process.
On the “ethnocentric” side of the dialectic in the Rwandan context
lies the ICTR, which exerted primary control over genocide and crimes
against humanity prosecutions.222 The ICTR attempted to bridge the gap
between the international and the domestic in Rwanda through the Rule 11
bis mechanism, but this mechanism did not manifest itself in reality as it
might have theoretically; namely, although the ICTR had the potential to help
foster a rule of law practice in Rwanda by transferring cases to its national
courts, the ICTR undermined the potential for judicial and rule of law growth
in Rwanda by distrusting Rwandan capabilities to try lower-level genocide
and crimes against humanity cases.223 These concerns of the ICTR were
illustrated in Prosecutor v. Munyakazi and Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga.224 In
the future, if the ICC prosecutes cases from Myanmar, it should utilize a Rule
11 bis-like mechanism to bolster rather than undercut the national-level courts
in Myanmar, even if the national courts do not align with all international
understandings of the rule of law (e.g., not having a completely independent
judiciary). Further, like the ICTR under Rule 11 bis, the ICC would have
supervisory authority over the national-level courts, and if the national courts
216
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implemented any severe rule of law transgressions in a proceeding, the
tribunal could recall the case.225 Through this proposed framework, Myanmar
could successfully implement grassroots, national, and international courts in
its efforts to sustain the rule of law and peace within its borders.
Lastly, this Comment emphasizes that the international community
must address the atrocities occurring in Myanmar. As stated by the deputy
director of Human Rights Watch’s Asia division, “[i]t’s like apartheid . . .
[i]t’s a horrific situation that has gone unnoticed by the world.”226 Before the
implementation of the framework discussed here, the violence must stop, and
this may require international intervention. Once this occurs, Myanmar can
begin the process of transitional justice. The international community learns
from its past, fraught as it is with regrettable crimes against humanity.
Although there will never be a perfect post-conflict solution, the likelihood of
future atrocities to human dignity necessitates an ongoing search for postconflict justice. This Comment ultimately suggests that this search must look
to past transitional justice attempts as intellectual resources for preemptive
solutions—even before a conflict has ended.
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